From institutional duality to institutional trifecta: Implications for family firms’ international subsidiaries by Heling Wang (5623247) et al.
From Institutional Duality to Institutional Trifecta:  
Implications for Family Firms’ International Subsidiaries 
Introduction  
Family enterprises are playing increasingly important roles in contributing to the global 
economy through internationalization (De Massis et al., 2018). In recent years, more family 
firms have adopted forms of internalization involving higher levels of commitment and become 
multinational corporations with subsidiaries in many different countries (Cesinger et al., 2016). 
Such activity introduces new challenges to family managers to do with cross-border 
management, adaptation to new institutions and transfer of capabilities. This results in the 
family firm being exposed simultaneously to at least two types of pressure: the family’s desire 
to protect and preserve its decision rights over its subsidiaries against institutional pressures to 
confirm to rules, regulations and standards different to its domestic market. 
The extant literature established that subsidiaries are subject to institutional duality 
(Kostova and Roth, 2002). This duality results from external institutional pressure on the 
subsidiary to adapt to laws, regulations and normative rules intended to dictate legitimate 
behaviour, while the subsidiary is also subject to internal pressure from the corporate parent to 
adopt its own approved best practice. Externally, institutions in the host countries can 
differentially influence firms’ internationalisation, both in terms of the processes of 
internationalisation and its results (Meyer et al., 2009). First, institutions are seen as the rules 
of the game in the foreign country market, and will therefore have an effect on the behaviour 
of the firm. Moreover, firms directly investing in a foreign market with a new subsidiary 
typically must adjust their behaviours to the ‘rules of the game’ as defined by the host country’s 
institutions. This adjustment  occurs as a response to coercive and mimetic institutional 
isomorphism (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983) and can affect the subsidiary’s performance in the 
foreign market (Mellahi et al., 2013). Internally, the corporate parent places its own 
institutional pressure on the subsidiary to adopt established practices that render legitimacy in 
the eyes of the parent. This pressure competes with the subsidiary’s efforts to adjust to external 
institutional pressure (Hughes et al., 2017). 
However, we argue that the family itself introduces an important institutional pressure 
unique to their subsidiaries. We theorize that family firms’ international subsidiaries are subject 
to a third institutional force, creating an institutional trifecta, that fundamentally affect the 
prospects of the family subsidiary. Specifically, we predict that: (1) the desire of family owners 
and managers in the domestic parental family firm to retain family control and family influence 
create a new third institutional pressure acting simultaneously on the family subsidiary; (2) that 
materially affect the behaviour and outcome of the subsidiary; and (3) potentially its survival 
by preventing the subsidiary from adapting to essential external institutional pressures. Given 
these institutional pressures, we are led by the following research question: how does the 
institutional trifecta manifest in the family subsidiary? How do family subsidiaries manage 
these trifecta of institutional pressures? What are the consequences for the family subsidiary 
from this institutional trifecta? 
We contribute to the family firm and international business literatures in two ways. 
First, we break new ground in the application of institutional theory in international business 
studies  by conceptualizing a third institutional force acting the international subsidiaries of 
multinational family businesses: the family institution. Second, we introduce the notion of 
institutional trifecta and propose how the subsidiary is shaped and affected by the synergy of 
these forces. 
 
Preliminary Literature Review and Background 
Family Firm Behaviour 
The central theory setting predictions of the behaviours and features of family firms is 
socioemotional wealth (SEW) theory (Berrone, Cruz and Gomez-Mejia, 2012). SEW theory 
suggests that a unique motivation of family firms in shaping any business operation is to protect 
family control, influence, and perpetuate family independence, protecting the family firms’ 
assets from appropriation from any parties other than the family members (Berrone et al., 2010). 
SEW represents nonfinancial wealth and is considered to be more important to family firms 
than financial wealth (Gomez-Mejia, Neacsu and Martin, 2017).  Therefore, family firms are 
prone to take higher risks to protect SEW (Chrisman and Patel, 2012).  
Research on family firms’ internationalisation processes shows that they tend to follow 
the establish chain (Johanson and Vahlne, 1977) of slowly accumulating knowledge of the 
foreign market to internationalize gradually in more controlled and measured ways to preserve 
family control over the business (Cesinger et al., 2016). Family firms tend to avoid 
international entry modes that could threaten family control and SEW (Pisano, 2018). 
Therefore, when using high commitment entry modes, family firms will rarely involve outside 
agents, organisations and members (Pukall and Calabrò, 2014). Foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in which international subsidiaries are created places the family’s wealth, financial and 
nonfinancial, at significant risk. Family firms with international subsidiaries face tremendous 
barriers that can interfere with their control and overseas management activities of the 
subsidiary (Buckley, 1989). The crucial areas of the family firm subsidiary that needs 
investigating include external institutional pressure to adopt domestic practices, parent firm 
pressure to accept the transfer of capabilities irrespective of the host market, and the family’s 
governance of the subsidiary, and their collective and competing implications for the subsidiary. 
 
Institutional Isomorphic Pressures to Adapt to the Host Market 
Neo-institutional theory introduces institutional isomorphism as a mechanism to predict 
subsidiary behaviour in the host country (Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). Isomorphism is a 
constraining process when pressures created by institutions in host country force the subsidiary 
to follow the behavioural or structural patterns of other organisations that face the same set of 
institutional conditions (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983). Institutions include formal and informal 
rules of the game that are confronted with subsidiaries in the markets where they operate, such 
as laws, regulations and cultures(Dacin, Goodstein and Scott, 2002). Coercive isomorphism 
predicts subsidiaries’ actions under conformist pressures from formal and informal institutions 
which determine the access to critical resources the organisations depend on to survive and 
compete in the host country(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Mimetic isomorphism predicts that 
subsidiaries undergoing uncertainty over the business environment in the host country 
combined with unclear goals from the company, ill-defined performance measures  and poorly 
understood technologies, would alter their structures or behaviours to mimic other companies 
in the same organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Previous studies have indicated 
the tendency for subsidiaries under coercive and mimetic pressures to replicate constructs of 
other firms (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) including conversion to homogenous organisational 
form (D’Aunno, Succi and Alexander, 2000), adoption of a certain operating system, and firm 
strategy (Lee and Pennings, 2016).  
Conformity to the institutional isomorphism by adopting particular templates of 
organising and operating in a locally accepted way can gain legitimacy domestically (Dacin, 
Goodstein and Scott, 2002). Subsidiaries require the endorsement of local social actors 
including government, business partners, customers, and the general public who are the 
important sources of support including social capital resources (Chan and Makino, 2007), 
material resources and technical information to survive and thrive in their social environments 
(Barney, 1991), and therefore have to conform to their prescriptions (Webb et al., 2009).  On 
the other hand, any forces preventing subsidiaries from adapting to the external institutions 
may lead to failure in being legitimate with any interests group, which could cause problems 
that threaten the survival of subsidiaries in the foreign market (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999).  
 
Parental Pressure to Receive the Transfer of Capabilities  
Institutionally, corporate parents exert their own institutional pressures on their 
subsidiaries to conform to practices deemed legitimate in the eyes of the parent (Kostova and 
Roth, 2002; Kostova, Roth and Dacin, 2008). In such instances, the pressure manifests as a 
desire for the subsidiary to accept and receive the transfer of best practices from the corporate 
parents – practices historically associated with competitive advantages (Mellahi et al., 2013). 
Organizational practices are valued by corporate parents as critical firm resources capabilities 
that are the fundamental for subsidiaries to succeed (Helfat and Winter, 2011). Studies have 
found empirical evidence supporting that successful transfer of parent’s best practice are 
positively related to subsidiary performance to some extent (Hughes et al., 2017). According 
to Tsai and Ghoshal (1998), the relationship between the subsidiary and the parent matters. 
Specifically, subsidiaries recognising the value and trusting the efficiency of the practices 
transferred from the parent will enhance their adoption of the practices. 
As the transferred practice is established as firm’s capability over time, the more exactly 
a practice is duplicated by a subsidiary from  its parent , the more legitimate the subsidiary 
might be internally (Chang, et al., 2009), and the more support the subsidiary will gain from 
the parent (Kostova and Roth, 2002). However, these historically best practices transferred 
from the corporate parent may not be judged as legitimate in the host country, thus creating a 
competing institutional duality acting on the subsidiary. For example, consistent findings have 
shown certain HRM practices are taken by MNEs as tools of controlling and managing their 
subsidiaries with rare adaptation to the host environment (Lervik and Björkman, 2007). The 
danger to the subsidiary in loyally adopting parental practices for parental legitimacy is that it 
loses the opportunity to adjust to external institutional pressure to adopt competing host 
practices and fails in gaining legitimacy with external environment (Mellahi et al., 2013). 
  
Family Pressure to Protect Ownership and Influence  
Resource-driven logic 
A commonly used definition of family business was proposed by Chua, Chrisman and 
Sharma, (1999) that “the family business is a business governed and/or managed with the 
intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled 
by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially 
sustainable across generations of the family or families”. The way family business is defined 
reveals that a basic feature of the family firm is its unique composition of the management 
team- team members are also family members. The defining feature of the family managerial 
configuration can differentially influence the internationalisation of the family business 
(Cerrato and Piva, 2012; Calabrò et al., 2013). Studies have found that family members in the 
top management team are motivated by coherent family goals, aspiring to higher level of 
business commitment and lower agency cost (Anderson and Reeb, 2016). Family firms can 
take advantage of the potential for lower agency costs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and elicit 
attitudes of stewardship (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 2006) if the managers expatriated to the 
overseas subsidiary belongs to the family of business owners. 
Expatriate assignment is normally used as a strategy by MNCs to transfer organisational 
capabilities across borders by sending experienced executives with extensive knowledge in the 
host market, for the purpose of enhancing success and minimising failure of business (Kawai 
and Chung, 2018). However, to protect the family ownership and control, family firms will 
expatriate family members to take over international subsidiary albeit their experience or 
expertise in the foreign market where the subsidiary operates does not suffice. The subsidiary 
would suffer problems of such sub-optimal appointment of executives who play a crucial part 
in deciding the subsidiary’s strategy and activities (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), which is a 
hidden danger to the survival of family firm subsidiary as well as the prospect to the family 
business. Therefore we argue that family owners of the business can introduce an unique 
pressure to family firms subsidiaries through expatriating family members as executives of the 
international subsidiary to maintain family control. 
Conceptual Framework 
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Family Firm 
Subsidiary
Family 
Organisational  
practices
Institutions
Socioemotional wealth logic 
Isomorphic logic
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
References 
Anderson, R. C. . and Reeb, D. M. . (2016) ‘Founding-Family Ownership and Firm 
Performance : Evidence from the S & P 500’, American Finance Association, 58(3), 
pp. 1301–1328. 
Barney, J. (1991) ‘Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantages’, Journal of 
Management, 17(1), pp. 99–120. 
Berrone, P. et al. (2010) ‘Socioemotional Wealth and Corporate Responses to Institutional 
Pressures : Firms Pollute Less ?’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 55(1), pp. 82–
113. doi: 10.2307/27856089. 
Berrone, P., Cruz, C. and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2012) ‘Socioemotional Wealth in Family 
Firms: Theoretical Dimensions, Assessment Approaches, and Agenda for Future 
Research’, Family Business Review, 25(3), pp. 258–279. doi: 
10.1177/0894486511435355. 
Buckley, P. J. (1989) ‘Foreign Direct Investment by Small and Medium Sized Enterprises: 
The Theoretical Background’, Small Business Economics, 1(2), pp. 89–100. doi: 
10.1007/BF00398627. 
Calabrò, A. et al. (2013) ‘The influence of ownership structure and board strategic 
involvement on international sales: The moderating effect of family involvement’, 
International Business Review, 22(3), pp. 509–523. doi: 
10.1016/j.ibusrev.2012.07.002. 
Cerrato, D. and Piva, M. (2012) ‘The internationalization of small and medium-sized 
enterprises: The effect of family management, human capital and foreign ownership’, 
Journal of Management and Governance, 16(4), pp. 617–644. doi: 10.1007/s10997-
010-9166-x. 
Cesinger, B. et al. (2016) ‘A socioemotional wealth perspective on how collaboration 
intensity, trust, and international market knowledge affect family firms’ 
multinationality’, Journal of World Business. Elsevier Inc., 51(4), pp. 586–599. doi: 
10.1016/j.jwb.2016.02.004. 
Chan, C. M. and Makino, S. (2007) ‘Legitimacy and multi-level institutional environments: 
Implications for foreign subsidiary ownership structure’, Journal of International 
Business Studies, 38(4), pp. 621–638. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400283. 
Chang, Y., Mellahi, K. and Wilkinson, A. (2009) Methods of Control and Emerging MNCs in 
the UK, International Journal of Human Resource Management. 
Chrisman, J. J. and Patel, P. C. (2012) ‘Variations in R&D Investment of Family and 
Nonfamily Firms: Behavioral Agency and Myopic Loss Aversion Perspectives’, 
Academy of Management Journal, 55(4), pp. 976–997. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J. and Sharma, P. (1999) ‘Defining the Family Business by 
Behavior’, Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, pp. 19–39. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-
6520.2006.00131.x. 
D’Aunno, T., Succi, M. and Alexander, J. A. (2000) ‘The Role of Institutional and Market 
Forces in Divergent Organizational Change’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 45(4), 
pp. 679–703. doi: 10.2307/2667016. 
Dacin, M. T., Goodstein, J. and Scott, W. R. (2002) ‘Institutional Theory and Institutional 
Change : Introduction to the Special Research Forum’, Academy of Management 
Journal, 45(1), pp. 45–46. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9299.2012.02105.x. 
Dimaggio, P. J. and Powell, W. W. (1983) ‘The Iron Cage Revisited : Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’, American 
Sociological Review, 48(2), pp. 147–160. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., Neacsu, I. and Martin, G. (2017) ‘CEO Risk-Taking and 
Socioemotional Wealth: The Behavioral Agency Model, Family Control, and CEO 
Option Wealth’, Journal of Management. doi: 10.1177/0149206317723711. 
Hambrick, D. C. and Mason, P. A. (1984) ‘Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection 
of Its Top Managers.’, Academy of Management Review, 9(2), pp. 193–206. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.1984.4277628. 
Helfat, C. E. and Winter, S. G. (2011) ‘Untangling dynamic and operational capabilities: 
Strategy for the (N)ever-changing world’, Strategic Management Journal, 32(11), pp. 
1243–1250. doi: 10.1002/smj.955. 
Hughes, M. et al. (2017) ‘Institutional and Resource-based Explanations for Subsidiary 
Performance’, British Journal of Management, 28(3), pp. 407–424. doi: 
10.1111/1467-8551.12169. 
Jensen, M. C. and Meckling, W. H. (1976) ‘Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency 
costs and ownership structure’, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), pp. 305–360. 
doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X. 
Johanson, J. and Vahlne, J. (1977) ‘The Internationalization Process of The Firm- A Model 
of Knowlege Development and Increasing Foreign Market Commitments’, Journal of 
International Business Studies, 8(1), pp. 23–32. doi: 10.1139/y89-072. 
Kawai, N. and Chung, C. (2018) ‘Expatriate utilization, subsidiary knowledge creation and 
performance: The moderating role of subsidiary strategic context’, Journal of World 
Business. Elsevier, 54(June 2017), pp. 24–36. doi: 10.1016/j.jwb.2018.09.003. 
Kostova, T. and Roth, K. (2002) ‘Adoption of an Organizational Practice by Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Corporations : Institutional and Relational Effects Author ( s ): Tatiana 
Kostova and Kendall Roth Source : The Academy of Management Journal , Vol . 45 , 
No . 1 ( Feb ., 2002 ), pp .’, The Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), pp. 215–
233. 
Kostova, T., Roth, K. and Dacin, M. T. (2008) ‘Institutional Theory in the Study of 
Multinational Corporations : A Critique and New Directions’, Academy of 
Management Review, 33(4), pp. 994–1006. 
Kostova, T. and Zaheer, S. (1999) ‘Organizational Legitimacy under Conditions of 
Complexity : The Case of the Multinational Enterprise’, Academy of Management 
Review, 24(1), pp. 64–81. 
Lee, K. and Pennings, J. M. . (2016) ‘Mimicry and the Market : Adoption of a New 
Organizational Form Source’, Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), pp. 144–162. 
Lervik, J. E. and Björkman, I. (2007) ‘Transferring HR practices within multinational 
corporations’, Human Resource Management Journal, 17(4), pp. 320–335. doi: 
10.1111/j.1748-8583.2007.00048.x. 
De Massis, A. et al. (2018) ‘Family firms in the global economy: Toward a deeper 
understanding of internationalization determinants, processes, and outcomes’, Global 
Strategy Journal, 8(1), pp. 3–21. doi: 10.1002/gsj.1199. 
Mellahi, K. et al. (2013) ‘Similarly different: A comparison of HRM practices in MNE 
subsidiaries and local firms in Turkey’, International Journal of Human Resource 
Management, 24(12), pp. 2339–2368. doi: 10.1080/09585192.2013.781434. 
Meyer, J. W. and Rowan, B. (1977) ‘Institutionalized Organizations : Formal Structure as 
Myth and Ceremony’, American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), pp. 340–363. doi: 
10.1086/226550. 
Meyer, K. E. et al. (2009) ‘Institutions , Resources, and Entry Strategies in Emerging 
Economies’, Strategic Management Journal, 30, pp. 61–80. doi: 10.1002/smj. 
Miller, D. and Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006) ‘Family governance and firm performance: 
Agency, Stewardship, and Capabilities’, Family Business Reviewy Business Review, 
19(1), pp. 73–87. doi: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2006.00063.x. 
Pisano, V. (2018) ‘The international entry mode of family-owned enterprises: a socio-
emotional wealth perspective’, International Journal of Comparative Management. 
Inderscience Publishers, 1(1), pp. 45–64. doi: 10.1504/IJCM.2018.091497. 
Pukall, T. J. and Calabrò, A. (2014) ‘The Internationalization of Family Firms: A Critical 
Review and Integrative Model’, Family Business Review, 27(2), pp. 103–125. doi: 
10.1177/0894486513491423. 
Tsai, W. and Ghoshal, S. (1998) ‘Social Capital and Value Creation : The Role of Intrafirm 
Networks’, The Academy of Management Journal, 41(4), pp. 464–476. doi: 
10.1016/S0969-5931(01)00061-0. 
Webb, J. W. et al. (2009) ‘You Say Illegal, I Say Legitimate: Entrepreneurship in the 
Informal Economy’, Academy of Management Review, 34(3), pp. 492–510. doi: 
10.5465/AMR.2009.40632826. 
 
